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From: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
To: BAREBOX <barebox@lists.infradead.org>
Cc: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 13/24] bootm: make unsigned image support runtime configurable
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 2025 15:17:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250820-security-policies-v1-13-76fde70fdbd8@pengutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250820-security-policies-v1-0-76fde70fdbd8@pengutronix.de>

From: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>

To allow runtime unlocking of a device via security policies, add a new
SCONFIG_BOOT_UNSIGNED_IMAGES option and consult it.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
---
 common/Sconfig | 15 +++++++++++++++
 common/bootm.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/common/Sconfig b/common/Sconfig
index 479ac5cdf2e560a638d39abbc9f91afe2edd7403..edbc4bc028af79e2a72bb86de94ecce5c7b7643d 100644
--- a/common/Sconfig
+++ b/common/Sconfig
@@ -7,3 +7,18 @@ config RATP
 	depends on $(kconfig-enabled,CONSOLE_RATP)
 
 endmenu
+
+menu "Boot Policy"
+
+config BOOT_UNSIGNED_IMAGES
+	bool "Allow booting unsigned images"
+	depends on $(kconfig-enabled,BOOTM_OPTIONAL_SIGNED_IMAGES)
+	help
+	  Say y here if you want to allow booting of images with
+	  an invalid signature or no signature at all.
+
+	  Systems with verified boot chains should say y here
+	  or force it at compile time irrespective of policy
+	  with CONFIG_BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES
+
+endmenu
diff --git a/common/bootm.c b/common/bootm.c
index 755c9358ce3a17c8ce37a9db13cf18d0aea1b5e7..17792b2a1d81a0d0164d9b899093395341475fc9 100644
--- a/common/bootm.c
+++ b/common/bootm.c
@@ -16,8 +16,10 @@
 #include <magicvar.h>
 #include <uncompress.h>
 #include <zero_page.h>
+#include <security/config.h>
 
 static LIST_HEAD(handler_list);
+static struct sconfig_notifier_block sconfig_notifier;
 
 static __maybe_unused struct bootm_overrides bootm_overrides;
 
@@ -114,6 +116,13 @@ static const char * const bootm_verify_names[] = {
 	[BOOTM_VERIFY_SIGNATURE] = "signature",
 };
 
+/*
+ * There's three ways to influence whether signed images are forced:
+ * 1) CONFIG_BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES: forced at compile time
+ * 2) SCONFIG_BOOT_UNSIGNED_IMAGES: determined by the active security policy
+ * 3) bootm_force_signed_images(): forced dynamically by board code.
+ *                                 will be deprecated in favor of 2)
+ */
 static bool force_signed_images = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BOOTM_FORCE_SIGNED_IMAGES);
 
 static void bootm_optional_signed_images(void)
@@ -141,6 +150,16 @@ static void bootm_require_signed_images(void)
 	bootm_verify_mode = BOOTM_VERIFY_SIGNATURE;
 }
 
+static void bootm_unsigned_sconfig_update(struct sconfig_notifier_block *nb,
+					  enum security_config_option opt,
+					  bool allowed)
+{
+	if (!allowed)
+		bootm_require_signed_images();
+	else
+		bootm_optional_signed_images();
+}
+
 void bootm_force_signed_images(void)
 {
 	bootm_require_signed_images();
@@ -149,7 +168,7 @@ void bootm_force_signed_images(void)
 
 bool bootm_signed_images_are_forced(void)
 {
-	return force_signed_images;
+	return force_signed_images || !IS_ALLOWED(SCONFIG_BOOT_UNSIGNED_IMAGES);
 }
 
 static int uimage_part_num(const char *partname)
@@ -1109,6 +1128,11 @@ static int bootm_init(void)
 	else
 		bootm_optional_signed_images();
 
+	sconfig_register_handler_filtered(&sconfig_notifier,
+					  bootm_unsigned_sconfig_update,
+					  SCONFIG_BOOT_UNSIGNED_IMAGES);
+
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ROOTWAIT_BOOTARG))
 		globalvar_add_simple_int("linux.rootwait",
 					 &linux_rootwait_secs, "%d");

-- 
2.39.5




  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-20 14:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-20 13:17 [PATCH 00/24] Add security policy support Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 01/24] kconfig: allow setting CONFIG_ from the outside Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 02/24] scripts: include scripts/include for all host tools Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 03/24] kbuild: implement loopable loop_cmd Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 04/24] Add security policy support Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 05/24] kbuild: allow security config use without source tree modification Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 06/24] defaultenv: update PS1 according to security policy Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 15:33   ` [PATCH] fixup! " Ahmad Fatoum
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 07/24] security: policy: support externally provided configs Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 08/24] commands: implement sconfig command Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 09/24] docs: security-policies: add documentation Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 10/24] commands: go: add security config option Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 11/24] console: ratp: " Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 12/24] bootm: support calling bootm_optional_signed_images at any time Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` Sascha Hauer [this message]
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 14/24] ARM: configs: add virt32_secure_defconfig Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:17 ` [PATCH 15/24] boards: qemu-virt: add security policies Sascha Hauer
2025-08-21  6:57   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2025-08-21 14:15     ` Sascha Hauer
2025-08-21 14:22       ` Ahmad Fatoum
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 16/24] boards: qemu-virt: allow setting policy from command line Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 17/24] test: py: add basic security policy test Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 18/24] usbserial: add inline wrappers Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 19/24] security: usbgadget: add usbgadget security policy Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 20/24] security: fastboot: add security policy for fastboot oem Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 21/24] security: shell: add policy for executing the shell Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 22/24] security: add security policy for loading barebox environment Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 23/24] security: add filesystem security policies Sascha Hauer
2025-08-20 14:39   ` Ahmad Fatoum
2025-08-20 13:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] security: console: add security policy for console input Sascha Hauer

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