From: Johannes Schneider <johannes.schneider@leica-geosystems.com>
To: barebox@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Johannes Schneider <johannes.schneider@leica-geosystems.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1] firmware: choose PBL fw-external verify algorithm via Kconfig
Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 19:56:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260613195626.1650288-1-johannes.schneider@leica-geosystems.com> (raw)
The PBL verifies fw-external blobs by hashing them in DRAM after the
BootROM-supplied load, before handing off to TF-A. SHA-256 is the
only choice today, and it runs with the MMU off and DRAM reads
uncached -- no D-cache, no hardware crypto, plain software hash
walking DRAM through the slowest available access path. The cost is
non-trivial.
Measured on Cortex-A53, MMU off, uncached DRAM:
SHA-256, ~720 KiB blob: ~2 s
CRC32, ~720 KiB blob: ~10 ms
That ~2 s sits in PBL phase 1, before BL31 entry, and is paid every
boot. When the SoC's secure boot (HABv4 on i.MX8M, AHAB on i.MX9, or
an upstream-signed FIT / bundle) already authenticates the blob
before the PBL ever sees it, the in-PBL SHA-256 is redundant: it
only re-checks the BootROM->DRAM copy against a value baked into the
PBL itself, not against an external trust anchor. A 32-bit CRC over
the same window catches the realistic failure mode (a corrupted copy
into DRAM) at ~200x lower wall-clock cost.
Make the verify algorithm a Kconfig choice:
PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_NONE no verify
PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_CRC32 4-byte CRC, cheap corruption check
PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_SHA256 current behaviour, default
firmware/Makefile selects an algorithm and passes it to gen-fw-s,
which emits nothing for NONE, a 4-byte .long for CRC32, or 32 bytes
for SHA-256 in the per-blob .rodata.<fwstr>.sha section. The macro
in include/firmware.h declares the verify symbols only when actually
used (offset != 0, i.e. fw-external blobs), so NONE is a true no-op
and in-tree firmware never grew a section dependency.
firmware_ext_verify() dispatches via IS_ENABLED() at compile time.
The verify-section symbol names (_fw_*_sha_*) are kept as-is rather
than renamed, since firmware_next_image_verify() also references
them for the FIRMWARE_VERIFY_NEXT_IMAGE path; under CRC32 the name
no longer describes the contents, but renaming would expand the
patch scope unnecessarily.
Default stays at SHA-256 so existing defconfigs keep their current
semantics.
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schneider <johannes.schneider@leica-geosystems.com>
---
firmware/Kconfig | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
firmware/Makefile | 15 ++++++++++--
include/firmware.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
include/pbl.h | 2 ++
pbl/decomp.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
scripts/gen-fw-s | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
6 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/firmware/Kconfig b/firmware/Kconfig
index b9b4556dbd..f745819a67 100644
--- a/firmware/Kconfig
+++ b/firmware/Kconfig
@@ -151,4 +151,37 @@ config FIRMWARE_VERIFY_NEXT_IMAGE
verified images. The function to check the next stage image hash is
firmware_next_image_verify(), make sure your SoC code uses it.
+choice
+ prompt "PBL fw-external blob verification"
+ default PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_SHA256
+ help
+ Algorithm used by the PBL to verify an fw-external blob against a
+ value embedded at build time, before handoff to TF-A. Runs with
+ the MMU off and DRAM reads uncached, so cost scales sharply with
+ blob size and algorithm. This checks integrity vs the build-time
+ value; it is not authentication against an external trust anchor.
+
+config PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_NONE
+ bool "none"
+ help
+ Skip the verify. Appropriate when the boot chain authenticates the
+ blob upstream of the PBL (HAB, AHAB, signed FIT, ...) -- the
+ in-PBL check is then redundant.
+
+config PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_CRC32
+ bool "CRC32"
+ select CRC32
+ help
+ 4-byte CRC32 (zlib polynomial). Catches accidental corruption
+ of the BootROM->DRAM copy; not cryptographic.
+
+config PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_SHA256
+ bool "SHA-256"
+ help
+ Cryptographic hash, software-computed with MMU off. Strongest
+ option but by far the slowest -- prefer NONE or CRC32 when the
+ blob is already authenticated upstream of the PBL.
+
+endchoice
+
endmenu
diff --git a/firmware/Makefile b/firmware/Makefile
index 7e433a1824..1590bed9f1 100644
--- a/firmware/Makefile
+++ b/firmware/Makefile
@@ -61,8 +61,19 @@ pbl-fwext-y := $(addsuffix .extgen.o, $(fw-external-y))
FWNAME = $(patsubst $(obj)/%.extgen.S,%,$(patsubst $(obj)/%.gen.S,%,$@))
-filechk_fwbin = $(srctree)/scripts/gen-fw-s $(FWNAME) $(FIRMWARE_DIR) .rodata '' $(fwobjdir)
-filechk_fwbin_ext = $(srctree)/scripts/gen-fw-s $(FWNAME) $(FIRMWARE_DIR) .pblext a $(fwobjdir)
+# Verify algorithm passed to gen-fw-s for fw-external blobs. Drives the
+# verify metadata section emitted into .extgen.S and matched by
+# firmware_ext_verify() in include/firmware.h.
+ifdef CONFIG_PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_NONE
+fw_verify_algo := none
+else ifdef CONFIG_PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_CRC32
+fw_verify_algo := crc32
+else
+fw_verify_algo := sha256
+endif
+
+filechk_fwbin = $(srctree)/scripts/gen-fw-s $(FWNAME) $(FIRMWARE_DIR) .rodata '' $(fwobjdir) sha256
+filechk_fwbin_ext = $(srctree)/scripts/gen-fw-s $(FWNAME) $(FIRMWARE_DIR) .pblext a $(fwobjdir) $(fw_verify_algo)
$(obj)/%.gen.S: FORCE
$(call filechk,fwbin)
diff --git a/include/firmware.h b/include/firmware.h
index 6511d56b2e..72a47f24e3 100644
--- a/include/firmware.h
+++ b/include/firmware.h
@@ -80,13 +80,21 @@ static inline void release_firmware(const struct firmware *fw)
void firmwaremgr_list_handlers(void);
-static inline void firmware_ext_verify(const void *data_start, size_t data_size,
- const void *hash_start, size_t hash_size)
+static inline void firmware_ext_verify(const void *data, size_t data_size,
+ const void *verify, size_t verify_size)
{
- if (pbl_barebox_verify(data_start, data_size,
- hash_start, hash_size) != 0) {
+ int ret;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_CRC32))
+ ret = pbl_barebox_verify_crc32(data, data_size,
+ verify, verify_size);
+ else
+ ret = pbl_barebox_verify(data, data_size,
+ verify, verify_size);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
putc_ll('!');
- panic("hash mismatch, refusing to decompress");
+ panic("firmware verify mismatch, refusing to decompress");
}
}
@@ -96,22 +104,31 @@ struct fwobj {
void *data;
};
+#if defined(CONFIG_PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_NONE)
+# define __fw_ext_verify(name, fwobj) do { } while (0)
+#else
+# define __fw_ext_verify(name, fwobj) \
+ do { \
+ extern char _fw_##name##_sha_start[]; \
+ extern char _fw_##name##_sha_end[]; \
+ firmware_ext_verify( \
+ (fwobj)->data, (fwobj)->size, \
+ _fw_##name##_sha_start, \
+ _fw_##name##_sha_end - \
+ _fw_##name##_sha_start); \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
#define __get_builtin_firmware(name, offset, fwobj) \
do { \
extern char _fw_##name##_start[]; \
extern char _fw_##name##_end[]; \
- extern char _fw_##name##_sha_start[]; \
- extern char _fw_##name##_sha_end[]; \
(fwobj)->data = _fw_##name##_start; \
(fwobj)->size = _fw_##name##_end - _fw_##name##_start; \
if (!(offset)) \
break; \
(fwobj)->data += (offset); \
- firmware_ext_verify( \
- (fwobj)->data, (fwobj)->size, \
- _fw_##name##_sha_start, \
- _fw_##name##_sha_end - _fw_##name##_sha_start \
- ); \
+ __fw_ext_verify(name, fwobj); \
} while (0)
diff --git a/include/pbl.h b/include/pbl.h
index fe4367825c..57ca8b4eb3 100644
--- a/include/pbl.h
+++ b/include/pbl.h
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ fdt_device_get_match_data(const void *fdt, const char *nodepath,
int pbl_barebox_verify(const void *compressed_start, unsigned int len,
const void *hash, unsigned int hash_len);
+int pbl_barebox_verify_crc32(const void *data_start, unsigned int len,
+ const void *crc, unsigned int crc_len);
int pbl_load_fdt(const void *fdt, void *dest, int destsize);
#define PBL_MALLOC_SIZE SZ_128K
diff --git a/pbl/decomp.c b/pbl/decomp.c
index 1539a6b67e..ace121eac6 100644
--- a/pbl/decomp.c
+++ b/pbl/decomp.c
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <pbl.h>
#include <debug_ll.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_CRC32
+#include <crc.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+#endif
#define STATIC static
@@ -90,6 +94,37 @@ int pbl_barebox_verify(const void *compressed_start, unsigned int len,
return memcmp(hash, computed_hash, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY_CRC32
+int pbl_barebox_verify_crc32(const void *data_start, unsigned int len,
+ const void *crc, unsigned int crc_len)
+{
+ uint32_t expected, computed;
+
+ if (crc_len != sizeof(uint32_t))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Stored little-endian by .long in the .rodata.*.sha section. */
+ expected = get_unaligned_le32(crc);
+ computed = crc32(0, data_start, len);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_LL)) {
+ puts_ll("CRC ");
+ puthexc_ll((computed >> 24) & 0xff);
+ puthexc_ll((computed >> 16) & 0xff);
+ puthexc_ll((computed >> 8) & 0xff);
+ puthexc_ll(computed & 0xff);
+ puts_ll(" vs ");
+ puthexc_ll((expected >> 24) & 0xff);
+ puthexc_ll((expected >> 16) & 0xff);
+ puthexc_ll((expected >> 8) & 0xff);
+ puthexc_ll(expected & 0xff);
+ putc_ll('\n');
+ }
+
+ return computed == expected ? 0 : -1;
+}
+#endif
+
void pbl_barebox_uncompress(void *dest, void *compressed_start, unsigned int len)
{
uint32_t pbl_hash_len;
diff --git a/scripts/gen-fw-s b/scripts/gen-fw-s
index 78c3193479..d7d7d15824 100755
--- a/scripts/gen-fw-s
+++ b/scripts/gen-fw-s
@@ -3,13 +3,20 @@
#
# Generate assembly source to embed firmware binary
#
-# Usage: gen-fw-s <fwname> <fwdir> <secprefix> [secflags] [fwobjdir]
+# Usage: gen-fw-s <fwname> <fwdir> <secprefix> [secflags] [fwobjdir] [verify-algo]
+#
+# verify-algo selects the metadata emitted in the .rodata.<fwstr>.sha
+# section, matched by firmware_ext_verify() in include/firmware.h:
+# sha256 (default) -- 32-byte SHA-256
+# crc32 -- 4-byte CRC32 (zlib polynomial)
+# none -- no section, no symbols
fwname=$1
fwdir=$2
secprefix=$3
secflags=$4
fwobjdir=$5
+verify_algo=${6:-sha256}
fwstr=$(echo "$fwname" | tr '/.-' '___')
fwpath="$fwdir/$fwname"
@@ -19,8 +26,6 @@ if [ -f "$fwpath" ]; then
fw_uncompressed=$(stat -c %s "$fwpath")
fi
-sha=$(sha256sum "$fwpath" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/ .*$//;s/../0x&, /g;s/, $//')
-
echo "/* Generated by scripts/gen-fw-s */"
echo "#include <asm-generic/pointer.h>"
echo ".section .note.GNU-stack,\"\",%progbits"
@@ -59,19 +64,39 @@ echo ".global _fw_z_${fwstr}_end"
echo "_fw_z_${fwstr}_end:"
echo "#endif"
-# include sha256, needed for external firmware
-echo " .section .rodata.${fwstr}.sha"
-echo " .p2align ASM_LGPTR"
-echo ".global _fw_${fwstr}_sha_start"
-echo "_fw_${fwstr}_sha_start:"
-echo " .byte ${sha}"
-echo ".global _fw_${fwstr}_sha_end"
-echo "_fw_${fwstr}_sha_end:"
-if [ -f "$fwpath" ]; then
- echo ".if _fw_${fwstr}_sha_start + 32 - _fw_${fwstr}_sha_end"
- echo ".error \"sha256sum invalid\""
- echo ".endif"
-fi
+# verify metadata for fw-external blobs, consumed by firmware_ext_verify()
+# in include/firmware.h. Driven by the PBL_FIRMWARE_EXT_VERIFY Kconfig
+# choice (passed in from firmware/Makefile).
+case "$verify_algo" in
+none)
+ ;;
+crc32)
+ crc=$(python3 -c 'import sys,zlib; sys.stdout.write("0x%08x" % zlib.crc32(open(sys.argv[1],"rb").read()))' \
+ "$fwpath" 2>/dev/null || echo "0x00000000")
+ echo " .section .rodata.${fwstr}.sha"
+ echo " .p2align 2"
+ echo ".global _fw_${fwstr}_sha_start"
+ echo "_fw_${fwstr}_sha_start:"
+ echo " .long ${crc}"
+ echo ".global _fw_${fwstr}_sha_end"
+ echo "_fw_${fwstr}_sha_end:"
+ ;;
+sha256|*)
+ sha=$(sha256sum "$fwpath" 2>/dev/null | sed 's/ .*$//;s/../0x&, /g;s/, $//')
+ echo " .section .rodata.${fwstr}.sha"
+ echo " .p2align ASM_LGPTR"
+ echo ".global _fw_${fwstr}_sha_start"
+ echo "_fw_${fwstr}_sha_start:"
+ echo " .byte ${sha}"
+ echo ".global _fw_${fwstr}_sha_end"
+ echo "_fw_${fwstr}_sha_end:"
+ if [ -f "$fwpath" ]; then
+ echo ".if _fw_${fwstr}_sha_start + 32 - _fw_${fwstr}_sha_end"
+ echo ".error \"sha256sum invalid\""
+ echo ".endif"
+ fi
+ ;;
+esac
# include a string containing the firmware name. When a non existing
# firmware is referenced in the PBL then _fwname_${fwstr} is referenced
base-commit: 6c70fb327d486376c1f2e37dfff2212cb9eebb1b
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-06-13 20:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-13 19:56 Johannes Schneider [this message]
2026-06-15 9:49 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2026-06-16 5:46 ` SCHNEIDER Johannes
2026-06-16 8:14 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2026-06-16 14:59 ` SCHNEIDER Johannes
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